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Abstract
The post-Cold War era in Europe in the 1990s has caused people to recognize
the complexity of economic development and economic co-operation. The opening of
borders has not always meant an increase in the cross-border economic activities in
general. On the contrary, the adverse socio-economic development of many border
areas has been unanticipated. The Finnish-Russian border is one example of this
dissonance.
This paper analyses the operation of Finnish companies in economic activities in
Russia during the 1990s. The study investigates barriers to the Finnish-Russian trade,
economic co-operation and foreign direct investment (FDI). A micro level approach is
applied aiming to find out what is the role of institutions, mental boundaries and pure
economic factors in this border-crossing development process.
The authors have chosen the mining company Pechenganickel and its employees
in two Russian mining towns on the Kola Peninsula, Nikel and Zapolyarnyj, as their
case study objects for the research. The employees in Nikel and Pechenga are very
conducive to foreign co-operation. Mental barriers are low, at least compared with the
outlook of Finns to Russians.
The economic activities of two Finnish companies in Russia have been studied.
One of the case study companies, Outokumpu, has operated as a supplier of
technological know-how to Russia and has investigated various investment projects
there. The strategy has been cautious and no acquisitions or notable FDI have been
executed.
Institutionalists blame high bureaucracy and complicated custom regulations for
the low level of cross-border trade and co-operation. Are there more important causes
beyond those factors? Is it just lacking demand and the disadvantageous location of
economic activities, which matter in border areas? Such argument can be supported as
well. This is illustrated by the success of the Baltic Beverage Holding AB (BBH). This
beer producer has a market share of 23 per cent in Russia and 40-50 per cent in the
Baltic States, and the growth continues. BBH’s success proves that in certain fields and
markets there are no insuperable institutional barriers for foreign companies in the
economies of those countries.
The study concludes that the main causes for sluggish development in many
sectors seem to be demand-driven and structural (and spatio-structural). The collapse of
the former economic system brought about such a deep and unanticipated decline that
not all the companies could properly cope with. Nevertheless, the study shows that there
is potential for trade and FDI to Russia in the future.
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1. Introduction
1.1 Transition and border
During the Soviet era the economic activities between Finland and the Soviet
Union were strictly controlled by the governments. Cross-border trade was handled by a
clearing system, and unlike most Western countries Finland continued to maintain this
kind of bilateral trade until the collapse of the Soviet Union. The trade between Finland
and the Soviet Union was notable, especially for Finland (25 per cent of the foreign
trade in 1982-1983), but individuals and entrepreneurs had very few direct cross-border
contacts. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 Russia was re-established, and
at the end of the same year president Yeltsin announced that the government would start
its radical reform which was going to transfer Russia from a centrally managed
economy to a market economy. President Yeltsin also promised to reduce the power of
central hierarchy in Moscow in a favor of regions. These statements by Yeltsin raised
vast hopes for genuine cross-border co-operation, for example, in Finland, which has a
1269 kilometers long borderline with Russia.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union the expectations towards newborn eastern
markets were overestimated and too hopeful (Ollila 1999, 27). This was the case also in
Finland and especially in the border areas (North Karelia, Kainuu and Lapland) which
constitute the Finnish outback (or less-favored areas), afflicted by unemployment, lack
of investments and business innovations. New eastern market area was hoped to be an
answer to many of these structural problems in Finland, at least in the long run.
Entrepreneurs, together with the public sector, commenced several new business and
education projects to be able to take advantage of the opportunities in the Russian
markets. The transition process of Russia to a market economy was hoped to happen in
a few years time.
Following the collapse of the communist system in 1989-1991 the emergence of
new states in Europe and simultaneously the enlargement of the European Union has
not been an unproblematic process. Political crises, even wars, in Europe in the 1990s
have proven the complexity of human territoriality. The opening of borders has not, in
many cases, meant, for example, increase in cross-border social or economic activities
(such as trade, flows of people and capital or foreign direct investments). On the
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slow and even for the worse. Except for the transit traffic and its positive spin-offs in
the Southeast, the situation on the Finnish-Russian border is one example of this kind of
sluggish economic relations. For example, in spite of the high hopes the share of
enterprises in Northern Finland which has managed to create stabilized business
relations to Russia is less that 5 per cent (Ollila 1999, 51).
Currently, there are in Europe 49 independent countries and several economic
and political regions, which means that Europe is full of both new and old borders. The
post-Cold War era has led to various attempts to lower the formal barriers of trade
created by borders. These attempts have originated from economic aims, but if a state or
trade border vanishes, what will happen to mental and social boundaries? The Finnish-
Soviet border was one example of the deep ideological and economic divides between
the East and West. During the 1990s, the political environment changed and direct
business contacts between enterprises increased. The Soviet legacy, however, still
remained. Russian companies succeed to export only raw materials, as they did in the
Soviet time. This has led to the concentration of trade into a few companies. For
example, between the Republic of Karelia and Finland in 1995 half of the export from
Karelia was by three enterprises (Statistic Finland 3/98, 29).
Borders are often results of wars and turmoil, and they do not vanish at once, as
it is the case in the Finnish-Russian border. All places and regions, as well as their
borders, are very much human constructs. That is, places are constructed out of
particular interactions and mutual articulations of social relations, experiences and
understandings (Massey 1993, 67). Social processes produce various types of borders,
and people perceive these borders differently. This emergence of socially constructed
borders has also taken place in communities along the Finnish-Russian border. The
border question has thus a strong mental dimension. How does it influence the
development potential of the border areas? Does it explain sluggish development?
1.2 Aims of this paper
Our purpose in this paper is to analyze how the recent economic interaction
(trade, FDI and co-operation between enterprises) between Finland and Russia has
developed and how this co-operation has succeeded. In addition, we will analyze the
development of the Finnish/Nordic enterprises in the Russian business environment and
the problems of Russian enterprises in the light of possible co-operation. A special focus
is on the problems of sluggish development in the border area.
The argumentation is based on two types of reasoning. First, the sluggish
development of the economic co-operation in areas, such as Karelia and the Murmansk
Oblast, is explained by differences in formal institutions and past socio-economic
structures. For example, foreign enterprises in Russia still have no trust in legislation
(especially in the enforcement of it) or in taxation. Several studies have proved that
institutional and political reasons play an important role in explaining the trends of
trade, business co-operation and FDI between Finland and Russia (Sutela 1996;
Kosonen 1997). Ambiguous legislation was considered as the most important obstacle
to cross-border co-operation among entrepreneurs in Lapland (Granberg & Ollila 1998).
Nevertheless, this explanation is not exhaustive. Are there any more important causes
beyond the experienced bureaucracy? Is it just lacking demand and the disadvantageous
3location of economic activities which matter. Such argument can be supported as well.
This is illustrated by the success of Baltic Beverage Holding AB (BBH). The reader will
see that one of the case studies to be presented below show that a foreign owned firm,
the BBH, has successfully developed business in Russia, despite the usual institutional
and regulatory impediments.
Second, if formal institutions are a cause, what about the people? What are their
attitudes to economic co-operation? Does the border matter and to whom? Do the
attitudes of employees reflect institutional barriers and to what extent? To answer these
questions, this research investigates the attitudes of employees of the Pechenganickel
mining company which operates in two towns of the Murmansk Oblast, Nikel and
Zapolyarnyj, in the vicinity of the Norwegian-Russian border.
The economic development on the both sides of the border has not corresponded
either to the expectations of entrepreneurs, or to the theories of economic interaction,
such as the growth triangle theory (Kivikari & Lindström 1999), the theories of
globalization (Dunning 1997), or the integration theory (Dunning & Robson 1988).
There is not much support from models of industrial (re)location and development,
either (Chapman & Walker 1992). As a theoretical aim our purpose in this study is to
find out the reasons for this mismatch between such theories and the evidence.
The Russian conditions of development have been difficult to conceptualize
empirically compared with the conditions in market economies, and to study within the
framework of theoretical models of economics and economic geography. This study is
grounded on the case-study approach and the amalgamation of several single studies.
Some simple statistical analyses have been applied. The focus is on the role of behavior
and institutions at the micro level.
1.3 Nikel and Zapolyarnyj and the Finnish-Russian border
Zapolyarnyj and Nikel (see Fig. 1) are industrial towns near the Russian-
Norwegian border in Murmansk Oblast. The industrial base of these towns consists of
nickel production operated by the Kola Metallurgical and Mining Company (KMMC),
which is a subsidiary of the large multilocal mining company of RAO Norilsk Nickel in
Russia. Norilsk Nickel is the largest nickel and palladium producer, as well as the
second largest platinum producer in the world. KMMC consists of two large companies
on the Kola Peninsula, Pechenganickel and Severonickel. The latter is located in
Monchegorsk. In the early 2000, the conglomerate employed 93 000, of which 75 000
were in Norilsk, 7 500 in Zapolyarnyj and Nikel, 7 000 in Monchegorsk and a few
thousand in Olenegorsk and St. Petersburg.
Administratively the towns of Nikel and Zapolyarnyj belong to the Pechenga
District (Fig.1). Currently these mining towns are facing restructuring problems - there
are too much labour force, and the industrial capital equipment dates back several
decades. Foreign partnership and collaboration have been considered as one alternative
for relieving restructuring problems. These restructuring problems have brought to light
the importance of international co-operation, foreign companies and borders.
4Figure 1. The mining towns Nikel and Zapolyarnyj in Kola Peninsula. Pechenga District
in grey.
In the Soviet Union, industry was highly centralized and politically controlled.
Industrial production was planned and organized from top to bottom. The goal was to
industrialize and urbanize the whole country. Nickel production and the geographical
position of the Kola Peninsula were also important from the military point of view. The
mining towns in Pechenga district were part of this centrally organized production and
defense system.
The regions of Russia opened up administratively in the 1990s. For example, the
Murmansk Oblast commenced to practice, at least at some level, its own foreign policy
during the 1990s. The Oblast participates in the Barents Region co-operation, which
aims to create a common economic and cultural region in the European north. The
Barents Region includes northern provinces of Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Russia.
In addition, several other countries and the EU are acting as observer members of this
regional co-operation. Although the results of this new northern regional co-operation
are quite insignificant, it has created direct contacts for the administration of Murmansk
with the Nordic countries and Brussels. During the Soviet era, the regions had very few,
if any, direct regional foreign co-operations.
51.4 Research methods
The questions listed in Section 1.2 will be examined mainly by case studies from
both sides of the border. The empirical work includes case studies among workers in the
mining towns and interviews and secondary data obtained from Finnish enterprises that
acquired experiences in the Russian business environment during the 1990s. The
potential of trade has been analyzed by a concise statistical analysis.
As the main case, the study analyses a survey from two mining communities,
Nikel and Zapolyarnyj, on the Kola Peninsula. The survey comprises interviews with
813 mining workers. The main aim of these interviews was to find out attitudes of
workers towards international co-operation and globalization. The authors have also
included historical and political features to get deeper understanding of the development
of the region and interviewed workers’ attitudes towards foreign co-operation. In
addition, several Russian public sector authorities were interviewed to find out their
aims towards international co-operation.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union the residents of Nikel and Zapolyarnyj
lost their ties to the central administration and they concretely became dependent on the
company. This meant that the only safety net of welfare services was based on the
benevolence of the mining company Norilsk Nickel. On the other hand, the mining
company is highly dependent on its workers. For example, the company is already
worried about getting capable labor force in the future to its peripheral production areas
(Kamkin 1998; Kotlyar 1999). Therefore, Norilsk Nickel is behaving as a welfare state
within a state. It is offering such social services to its workers that in advanced socio-
economic conditions are provided by the public sector and service companies. The
company is cautious, for example, with its labor force downsizing policy. Because of
this dependency and the costs of labor turnover the social dimension of development is
taken into account in the decision making and future planning of the company. Hence, it
is important for the company to know about workers’ attitudes and expectations towards
restructuring and the participation of the company in the increasing globalization which,
in part, made it possible for our project to interview people in these single industry
towns.
The mining industry in Russia has faced the decline of domestic market and the
international competition in the 1990s. During the Soviet era almost the whole ore
production was directed to the domestic markets. By contrast, nowadays, for example,
Pechenganickel exports more than 90 per cent of its nickel and copper production
(Fleming UCB 1999, 3). Consequently, Pechenganickel has to cope with the
consequences of the cyclical world markets (Andreev, Rautio and Tykkyläinen 2000).
While, in the Soviet era, Pechenganickel was mainly concentrating on increasing its
production figures, now the company must cut down production costs to be able to stay
in the global mining business. Furthermore, to improve its competitiveness, the
company has carried out investment projects and joint ventures with foreign companies.
Therefore, we include in our study interviews with mining managers that help to
investigate their experiences and aims towards these new contacts.
Experiences of the Finnish companies in the Russian markets have been of great
interest for several researchers (for example Hirvensalo 1996, 1999; Salmi 2000;
Törnroos and Nieminen 1999). These studies have analyzed, for example, market
relationships, the market entry process, and the operational and financial strategies of
Finnish companies in Russia and Eastern Europe. The case studies presented in this
6paper concern one Nordic company (Baltic Beverage Holding AB) and one Finnish
company (Outokumpu Oyj). The latter has a long experience in the Russian markets
inasmuch as Outokumpu operated in the Soviet Union. These companies represent two
types of co-operation: 1) resource-based heavy industry which was traditionally
prioritized during the Soviet time, and 2) the penetration of a foreign company to
consumer markets in metropolitan environments.
The level of trade and foreign direct investments between Finland and Russia
(especially the neighboring areas) is analyzed by investigating the trends as well as by
making comparisons in the trade figures between Finland and the Soviet Union.
Although, the Finnish-Soviet trade was bilateral clearing trade and it was highly
politicized, the comparison is justified, because Russia is economically the most
important state succeeding the USSR. The comparisons are also partly made by
applying the gravity model of international trade which is used by several economists to
identify especially the trade potential between two countries (for example Holzmann
and Zukowska-Gagelmann 1998). However, it is important to notice that to explain the
trade to or from Russia by using the gravity model is problematic, for example, because
of its abstract nature.
1.5 Theoretical background
According to many standard geographical and economic theories, the differences
in costs, profits and the prices of production factors gradually become evened out when
the border between two economic systems disappears. As a reaction to the outflow of
capital and jobs, high-cost areas develop dynamic competence. However, this
assumption of convergence is not obvious and not the only possible scenario. For
instance, the relations between USA and Mexico (land border area) and Russia and
Japan (sea border area) are examples of different kinds of (un-)development. Even in
relatively homogeneous socio-economic conditions (same language, national identity,
culture, and similar locational attributes, etc.) the economic convergence takes time as
the case of new Bundesländer in Germany indicates.
The volume of trade between Finland and Russia has varied in the course of time
reflecting political and institutional differences between the countries. Between 1809-
1917 Finland was a part of Russia and the trade was boosted by the growth of St.
Petersburg and the growth of the Russian economy. Socialism was introduced in the
Soviet Union and the political and trade relations between the capitalist Finland and its
neighbor were not intense at all. The post World War II interaction was based on
bilateral trade agreements, and when the Soviet Union collapsed, trade declined because
the Finnish companies did not have the advantage of fixed prices and planned markets
brought by former agreements. Figure 2 shows the long cycles of trade reflecting the
political eras: 1) integration, 2) separation, 3) co-operation and 4) competition.
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Figure 2. Russia’s/Soviet Union’s share of Finland’s (up to 1917 Finland was Grand
Duchy of Russia) import and export in 1861-1999 (Rautava 1998, 6. Updated in 2000).
When the era of competition (and the opening up of Russia) commenced, there
were many expectations of the reconstruction of Russian production systems in co-
operation with foreign companies. This led to the expectation of the rapid convergence
of Russian and market economies. The convergence of diverse economic systems is
possible when barriers to the flow of commodities and capital are lowered. For instance,
when a favorable business environment is created: 1) marked differences in wages are
anticipated to lead to a flow of industrial capital to a low-cost area (in order to utilize
low-wage labor); 2) the opening of a border creates possibilities for investment flows to
move to low-cost and natural resources areas; and finally, 3) the out-datedness of
industrial capital is expected to lead to replacement investments.
As shown, it is easy to find theoretical arguments for the expectations of
increasing interaction between Finland and Russia, and especially at the Finnish-
Russian border territories. Nevertheless, no part of this reasoning has been proved to be
true. On the contrary, the economic development in the 1990s, in terms of output and
employment growth, has been very negative.
The decline of the economies of the Russian North and Northwest indicates that
many parts of the resource-based economy there are non-competitive. The restructuring
of these industries took place very slowly in the 1990s. Various explanations have been
offered as reasons for this economic stagnation in Russia. Institutional and political
factors, for example, taxes, custom tariffs and trade regulations, have been regarded as
crucial in this decline (Sutela 1996; Kosonen 1997; Tykkyläinen & Jussila 1998;
Granberg & Ollila 1998). The structures of economy did not fit in the principles of
market economy. As a result, demand declined and the oversupply of needless
production prevailed. The extensive use of non-cash modes of payment, massive tax and
wage arrears, and the mutual indebtedness of companies led in the 1990s to a very
inefficient economy (Gaddy & Ickes 1999). However, the recent development shows
that the Russian economy has passed the bottom of depression. The share of barter trade
in the Russian economy is declining (Bank of Finland 2000), for example, Norilsk
Nickel has managed to get rid of its barter transactions (Fleming UCB 1999, 11).
The problem of a suitable politico-institutional milieu for the economic
environment in Russia has impacts on the development of the border areas, such as
Murmansk Oblast and Karelian Republic. Although the border between the states is no
longer so inaccessible, the socio-economic systems in both countries, i.e. in Finland and
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capital is well educated, the entire socio-economic system has only few suitable
attributes which fit well to a market economy. Thus, the total labor related costs are not
as low as the nominal wages indicate. This is especially the case in the Russian North.
One may also blame the regulation of the economy, which turns attention again to the
issues of institutions within Russian society – the embedded ways of thinking and
reasoning.  One example of these protectionist regulations in the Russian legislation is
the requirement that foreign companies must carry out their projects mainly by using
Russian labor and equipment (for example, in the oil business the Russian share must be
at least 70 per cent). Nevertheless, these institutionalist and regulation-theoretical
perspectives do not fully explain all the development. There are successful cases,
despite the existing institutions.
2. Changing Geographies of the Finnish-Russian Border
2.1 Pechenga District
At the beginning of the 20th century the Pechenga, consisting of mountains, a
valley, and a fjord, was still so called no man's land in the Russian North. In the Peace
Treaty of Tartu in 1920 the Pechenga was annexed by Finland. At the beginning of the
Finnish period, Pechenga was seen as an untouched arctic territory which tempted
especially artists and researchers for expeditions. However, this romanticized period
was ended during the 1930s, when nickel ore was found. Pechenga experienced rapid
construction phase which led, of course, to colonization. The number of inhabitants in
Pechenga was tripled during the 1930s (Onnela 1999, 105). At that time, the
superpowers of Europe, the Soviet Union, Germany, and England, started to express
their demands towards the nickel ore of Pechenga. Actually, from the early 1940s
Finland had to try balance these demands and to export most of the production, in spite
that the domestic demand was sufficient to absorb the production.
The World War II changed again the fate of the Pechenga. During the Winter
War (1939-1940) the region was occupied by the Soviet troops, but it was unexpectedly
handed over to Finland in the peace agreement. The reason for this action by Stalin was
probably the interest of England towards the region (Vahtola 1999, 303). Therefore,
Finland was able to continue the interrupted construction work. However, the
Continuation war (1941-1944) between Finland (this time together with Germany) and
the Soviet Union ended the Finnish period in Pechenga, all the people who had moved
to Pechenga earlier were evacuated (Kälkäjä 1999).
After the war massive reconstruction projects were commenced on the Pechenga
area. Retreating troops had destroyed industrial premises and dwellings, and now
reconstruction was mainly done by soldiers and prisoners (Kiseljov & Kiseljova 1995,
147). After the war, the demand for nickel in the Soviet Union was high which entailed
that Pechenga was rebuilt in a few years. At the end of 1945 the town of Nikel had
already 7000 inhabitants, and in the middle of the 1950s the new town of Zapolyarnyj
was built close to the new ore deposits about 30 kilometers from Nikel (Kiseljov 1999).
Russians have constructed industrial premises, houses, roads, railways and an airport
within the mining area. Only a couple of dwelling houses were left from the Finnish era.
9The Pechenga District, as the whole Murmansk Oblast, can be seen as a product
of the Soviet era (Hansen and Tønnessen 1998, 31). Part of its urban network was built
for exploitation of the ore reserves and to produce metals and minerals for the needs of
the Soviet Union. In addition, the Murmansk Oblast was, and still is, an important
military area. Military bases are mainly situated in the northern parts of Murmansk
Oblast (Fig. 3). Murmansk is a very important harbor. More than 80 per cent of the
inhabitants live in urban agglomerations.
Figure 3. Military areas of the Murmansk Oblast.
The natural environment of Pechenga has been damaged badly, because of the
mining industry. Until the end of the 1970s, the annual sulfur oxide emission of the
Pechenganickel smelter in the city of Nikel was 400 000 tons, which was subsequently
lowered to 250 000 tons (Blatov 1992, 3). In the whole Murmansk oblast an estimated
area of 8 100 hectares is damaged beyond rehabilitation, caused by the mining industry
(Kotova and Nikitina 1998, 553).
Environmental problems are an important impetus for the modernization of the
mining activities from the viewpoint of Finland and Norway. Since the Soviet Union
collapsed in 1991 the Pechenga District became accessible via the Storskog crossing
point from Norway. The era of closed towns was over. Pechenga became linked to the
West.
2.2 Finnish-Soviet trade
After the World War II the Finnish-Soviet economic relations were commenced
by reparations and trade. Already at the end of 1940s export from Finland to the Soviet
Union was more than 20 per cent of the total exports (Statistic Finland 3/1998, 6). This
bilateral clearing trade was balanced by the governments.
Trade was hierarchically handled from top to bottom which supposed that
enterprises in Finland had to have a license for the export. This led to a high level of
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bureaucracy and trade dominated by large-scale firms. For example, in 1989 the total
number of Finnish exporters to the Soviet Union was 1 688, but more than 50 per cent
of the total Finnish export to the Soviet Union was handled by the 10 largest export
enterprises (Laitila 1995, 107). In the Finnish-Soviet trade the SME sector had mainly
the role of subcontractors.
One of the peculiarities of this kind of trade was that there were no cross-border
money transfers. The central banks, the Bank of Finland and Gosbank (later VTB and
VEB) signed a clearing agreement and through their accounts these organizations kept
the trade in balance. Excess exports could be balanced only by increasing imports
(Laitila 1995, 75). However, the non-marketable attributes of the Soviet products made
it difficult to find products for import. Consequently, Finland was mainly able to import
raw materials, energy, and oil. When, for example, the oil prices went down the balance
of Finnish-Soviet trade was difficult to achieve. Therefore, for example in the 1980s
Finland exported several years consecutively more than imported, which meant that
Russia inherited debts from this Finnish-Soviet clearing trade after the collapse of the
Soviet Union.
The Finnish-Russian trade was stabilized near to the level of 20 per cent of the
total Finnish foreign trade until the beginning of the 1990s. The collapse of the Soviet
Union crashed this trade and brought about a severe crisis for various industries in the
Finnish economy. At the end of the 1980s the share of the Finnish foreign trade to the
Soviet Union was about 15 per cent and suddenly it decreased to around 5 per cent. This
brought about the loss of 150 000 jobs and about 2 per cent decline of the total output of
Finland (Rautava & Hukkinen 1992, 5). During the 1990s Finnish foreign trade to
Russia recovered, but the collapse of rouble in August 1998 caused again difficulties
(fig. 4). Immediately after the rouble crisis, in September 1998, the Finnish exports
dropped to less than a half, from August, and the bottom was reached in January 1999
(Finnish National Board of Customs, 2000). Concerning the FDI figures, the crisis had
even more dramatic consequences.
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Figure 4. Finnish export and import to Russia/Soviet Union 1989-1999 (Finnish
National Board of Customs, 2000).
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2.3 East of the Border: Finnish mindscapes and economic
opportunities
After World War II the Finnish-Soviet border changed dramatically. In the peace
agreement in 1944 Finland lost three regions, Karelia, Salla and Pechenga (Fig. 5).
Especially, the Karelian case was, and still is, painful for the Finns. Approximately 420
000 people (11 per cent of the country’s population) migrated from the ceded territories
to Finland and resettled. A discussion about the restitution of Karelia started after the
Cold War. The Northern regions, Salla and Pechenga, have not caused this kind of
debate, mainly because those regions were sparsely populated during the Finnish period.
In addition, the landscape changes, especially in Pechenga have caused mixed feelings
in the former Finnish residents during their visits to the region (Autere 1989).
Figure 5. Areas ceded to the Soviet Union after World War II.
Territories beyond the Russian northern land border with Finland were almost
inaccessible before the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Pechenga District was one of
these closed regions. What Finns had kept in their minds were nostalgic memories of
the ceded Karelia, Salla and Pechenga, propaganda from the war times and talks about
Siberia as the pre-1917 destination of convicts. The last-mentioned era consists of
reminiscences from the time of Finnish Autonomy, 1809-1917. Russia’s image among
the Finnish people is not very positive (EVA 1993, 56-80).
The Finnish-Russian border has been the divide between East and West since the
World War I, and even for before that (Medvedev 1998). During the Cold War the
Russian North and Siberia were tacit and secret territories for laymen, but they
constituted an economic area which was economically important for the Finns. The
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high-latitude zone of Russia was, and had actually been already before the time of the
Soviet Union, a source of raw wood, oil, gas, and minerals. The Finnish companies
supplied a great deal of the machinery installed in saw mills, pulp and paper mills,
mines and smelters in the northern territories. Those areas were chiefly platforms for
all-Union companies – not regions in the European sense. The northern parts of Russia
were only mentioned in consignment notes of deliveries to somewhere in Russia.
Everything changed in 1990. Access to Murmansk Oblast, Karelia and
Leningrad Oblast was no longer restricted and strictly controlled, and possibilities to do
business  across the border commenced. Already before perestroika, border-trade was
conducted in barter form between Finnish and Russian companies, but the volume was
small. The openings in the early 1990s made it possible for both companies and
individuals to conduct business. State organizations as middlemen disappeared, and no
bilateral agreements regulated trade any more. Based on expectations of vast markets
and resources on the 'other' side, there was great enthusiasm in Finland not only to visit
the Russian border territories, but also to commence business. But when the economic
decline continued in Russia, almost the entire 1990s turned out to be an economic
disappointment.
Before 1990, people had even less cross-border contacts on the Soviet side of the
border. The border area was strictly controlled and displacements of population in
Stalin's Soviet Union braked the former contacts. For example, in the Pechenga District,
local people had no contacts to the Finnish side and there are very few signs kept from
the Finnish period. The official history of the region does not tell very much about the
Finnish period. For example, the local museum only shows that the region was freed
from the Nazis by the Soviet troops. Likewise, even the newest brochure of the mining
company Norilsk Nickel claims that the region used to be part of Norway (Norilsk
Nickel 1999).
During the 1990s cross-border contacts between the northern parts of Finland
and Russia have mainly been flows of goods and small-scale tourism. The exports from
Murmansk Oblast have been metals to international markets and fish to Norway, while
Karelia has exported roundwood and iron ore to Finland. Investments in factories on the
Russian side have been negligible. There were expectations that they could partake in
the construction of an industrial base in the Russian North and Northwest, but these
plans have not been carried through. This has clearly been a disappointment for the
companies which delivered machinery to the East as well as for companies which
expected that the opening up of the border will boost investments into the border areas.
2.4 Differences between Finland and neighboring regions of Russia
During the Cold War, the borderline between Finland and the Soviet Union was
part of the Iron Curtain which separated the East and the West. This borderline
separated two worlds which had different economies, culture, politics, language, and
hegemonic essence. At the beginning of the 1990s the opening of the Finnish-Russian
border made people to realize that this border comprised one of the biggest economic
gaps in the relatively limited geographic area of the whole world. During the 1990s this
gap became even wider (Fig. 6 and 7). In addition, the gap is not only in GDP per
capita, but the difference is huge also in the quality of life. For example, the life
expectancy in Leningrad area is about 15 years less than in Finland (Kivikari &
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Lindström 1999, 86). In Pechenga District the situation is even worse because of the
harsh conditions.
Figures 6 and 7. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and GDP per capita measured at
official exchange rates and Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) by region in 1997. Sources:
Statistics Finland (1999, p. 102), and www.stat.fi, Regional Accounts, Table 2.10,
December 1999.
One of the reasons for the increase of the gap can be found in the process of
transition. The economic turmoil in Russia has meant a huge crisis to the domestic
markets which has led to the collapse of output and particularly the industrial
production (Fig. 8). One of the transition factors was that in the beginning of the 1990s
Russian industry was forced to face global competition which was a new kind of reality
to the formerly central controlled and mainly in domestic markets operated industry. It
took few years before, for example, the Russian mining industry realized that instead of
increasing the production figures they should concentrate to cut the costs and improve
the quality of their products to be competitive (Rantanen 2000).
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Figure 8. Industrial production (1990=100). Sources: Statistics Finland (2000), STV, and
unpublished data from Statistics Finland.
The gap in the Gross Domestic Product per capita between a Russian region and
the neighboring landregion of another country is the widest in the northernmost land
border territories of Russia (Murmansk Oblast, Karelian Republic, and Leningrad
Oblast). Table 1 depicts the economic situation in these border territories. As it turns
out, the resource-based Karelia and the Murmansk Oblast are relatively wealthy and
export-oriented, but unemployment figures indicate that there are structural problems
(Table 1; cf. van Selm 1998). Leningrad Oblast and St. Petersburg seem to benefit much
more from foreign investments than Karelia and Murmansk Oblast do. Industrial
production in all these regions has been recovering after the 1998 devaluation (Table 1).
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Table 1. Economic and social indicators in 1997-1999.
Region Population as
percentage of
the Russian
total
Un-
employment,
per cent
Monthly,
income
per earner,
USD
Foreign
investments
per capita
(stock),
USD
Industrial
production,
percentage
change on
a year-by-
year basis
Murmansk
Oblast
1997 0.700 18.5 232 3 13
1998 0.691 21.0 105 10 -4
1999 0.682 16.5 150 15 5
Karelian
Republic
1997 0.529 11.9 184 5 1
1998 0.528 16.6 59 6 -3
1999 0.526 15.8 90 21  21
Leningrad
Oblast
1997 1.138 12.8 113 102 -4
1998 1.143 15.0 36 114 -0
1999 1.146 14.5        58 172  8
St. Petersburg
1997 3.240 9.9 183 49 7
1998 3.228 11.3 59 87 -0
1999 3.223 11.1  114 148 7
Russian
Federation
1997 100 11.8 173 83 2
1998 100 13.3 59 80 -5
1999 100  11.7  59 65 8
Sources: Computed by the author from data in Statistics Finland (2000) and from IBS-
service (Statistics Finland); data originate from Goskomstat Rossii.
3. Finnish trade and FDI to Russia
3.1 Finnish-Russian trade
In this section the Finnish-Russian trade potential are estimated by using the
gravity model. Two economist, Tinbergen and Pöyhönen developed the gravity model,
in the 1960s. The model is applied to predict the potential of trade between two
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countries. The equation of the simplest version of the model includes only GDP figures
and the distance of two countries. The model assumes that trade is positively related to
the level of GDP in both countries and inversely to the physical distance of the
countries. More sophisticated versions include more variables like population figures,
cultural differences and several other dummies (for example common language region).
The gravity model used in this study is created by Meronen (1997). The
structure of this model is simple, but the results and the correlation coefficient (87 per
cent) given by more complicated versions (for example the Erkkilä-Widgren (1994)
equation) do not differ considerably in the case of Finnish-Russian trade (Partanen
1998). The parameters of the model are based on calculations whose starting-point is the
internal trade of EU-countries (Meronen 1997). For the sake of comparison, our
investigation includes Sweden and Estonia as two other neighboring countries of
Finland.
The potential trade is estimated by following equation:
tij = 5.54 + 0.80 · yi + 0.82 · yj - 1.06 · dij
The equation is in logarithmic form and variables are:
tij = the value of export from country i to country j,
yi = the GPD of the exporting country,
yj = the GPD of the importing country,
dij = the distance between the respective countries.
Table 2. Values of the variables of the model in 1999.
Russia Sweden Estonia Finland
Export from Finland to (Million ECUs)* 1 607 3 901 1180
Distance from Finland to (Kilometers) 381 395 87
GDP (Billion ECUs)** 214.3 227.84 4.47 135.06
* Finnish National Board of Customs 1999
** OECD 1999
In the model by Meronen the distance is measured by evaluating average of the
five biggest cities to find out the theoretical center of the country (Partanen 1998, 9). In
this study the distance between Finland and Russia is population weighted average from
Helsinki to St.Petersburg/Moscow, because these two cities together with surrounding
areas cover more than half of the total import of Russia (Statistic Finland 1999, 75).
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Table 3. Model results: Finland’s actual and potential export to Russia, Sweden, and
Estonia in 1999 (Finnish National Board of Customs, 2000, and own calculations).
Country Actual (million ECUs) Potential (million ECUs) Actual/Potential
Russia 1 607 2 629   61 %
Sweden 3 901 2 649 147 %
Estonia 1 188    525 226 %
Table 3 shows that according to the gravity model, there exists unused Finnish
export potential to Russia. On the other hand, Finnish export to Sweden and especially
to Estonia is clearly larger than the model predicts. Finland’s high export figures to
Sweden can be explained by common history and culture, stable and reliable markets,
and the two countries’ EU membership. Estonia as a market area is tempting for Finland
because of the common language area and Estonia’s strong efforts to integrate into the
EU markets. In addition, a great part of the Finnish-Estonian trade can be explained
with dual gateway operations to CIS and Western countries (Kivikari 1997, 310). On
the other hand, Russian markets are lacking most of these factors which partly explains
the unused trade potential.
3.2 Finnish FDI to Russia
Russia is the biggest country in Europe measured by surface area and
population, but as a market area, Russia is only the size of Sweden (based on the value
of import). The size of the economy of Russia (i.e. its GDP) is often compared to the
Netherlands. The Russian economy has been unstable and the total output declined
dramatically in the 1990s. On the other hand, the country has ample natural resources
and skilled labor. The seedbed of foreign and joint ventures in Russia is rather unique in
economic history.
The ownership of at least 10 per cent of the voting shares of a foreign enterprise
is the definition of IMF for foreign direct investment (FDI). In addition, the character of
FDI is to make profit for the investment by getting into the decision making process of
the target enterprise, for example, by changing business idea or strategy (Hirvensalo
1999, 6). Finnish investors in Russia usually acquire majority share in their direct
investment projects.
The long experience from the Finnish-Soviet trade caused expectations that the
Finnish enterprises would have ample knowledge of the market and would be eager to
invest to Russia. In addition, the deep economic crisis in the beginning of the 1990s in
Finland motivated Finnish enterprises to find new markets. Therefore, Russia was seen
as a promising market area which could lower the effects of the economic crisis.
However, during the last decade Finnish enterprises have mainly concentrated in trade
actions in Russia. In spite of the geographical closeness, trade relations, and the long
common history Finnish business has been cautious to make investments to Russia.
According to the Russian trade statistics in 1997, Finland was among the 10 biggest
exporters and importers but not among the biggest investors to Russia (Hirvensalo 1999,
1).
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The cautious investment policy of Finnish enterprises in Russia can be explained
by internal and external reasons. Finland joined the European Union in 1995 which
eased the access to the main European markets. Furthermore, the most rapidly growing
industrial sector in Finland has been telecommunication industry whose biggest markets
are in Europe, the USA, and Asia. Thus, many Finnish, internationally operating,
enterprises have changed their interests from Russia to faster growing and more stable
markets. At the same time, the SME sector has increased its share in the Finnish-
Russian trade (Komulainen & Taro 1999, 5). However, Finnish direct investments to
Russia are still mainly done by large enterprises. For example, in 1997 almost half of
the stock of assets were covered by the 5 biggest investment projects (Rautava 1999, 6).
Factors, such as size, legacy, culture and instability, explain the low level of
Finnish FDI to Russia. When studying Finnish FDI to the Baltic Sea countries (Fig. 9) it
is obvious that Finnish investors have been extremely cautious with Russia.
Figure 9. Finnish foreign direct investment to the Baltic Sea countries in 1994-1998.
(Country’s share of Finland’s FDI (stock) to the Baltic Sea region in 1998). (Bank of
Finland 1999).
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Russia has not been very successful in receiving FDI from foreign countries
during the 1990s. Compared to East-European countries like Hungary, Poland, and the
Czech Republic all of which have applied the EU membership, Russia is far behind.
Finnish investors have been even more cautious with Russia than others. For example,
in 1998 Estonia (population 1.4 million) received almost as much Finnish FDI as Russia
did (population 147 million). The August 1998 rouble crises caused losses to most of
foreign enterprises in Russia. After the collapse of the rouble Finnish FDI to Russia
were staunched almost totally (Hirvensalo 1999), but they recovered later.
The geographical distribution of investments indicates that the investments are
directed to the main metropolises, especially to Moscow. In the Finnish-Russian border
area the focus is in the South, in St. Petersburg and the Leningrad Oblast (Table 1). The
resource-based areas have got investments if there is gas and oil industry. Significant
investments have been carried out in the regions of Omsk, Tjumen, Tomsk, and
Krasnoyarsk. One can find support to the hypothesis, that it is just lacking demand, idle
production and production factors located disadvantageously which are the primary
causes for low investments in the border area.
3.3 Experiences of Finnish enterprises in the Russian markets
During the Soviet era several Finnish, especially large scale, companies
managed to create stable business relations with the Soviet Union which lasted decades.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union these former business relations were hoped to
help Finnish companies extending their presence in the Russian markets. However, after
few years it became evident that the transition process in Russia will take more time
than it was expected to.
The principles of co-operation changed as well; the Finnish-Soviet trade used to
be part of the foreign policy of states which had given favor to the Finnish companies in
the Soviet markets. But the collapse of the Soviet Union opened the Russian markets to
every importer or exporter, and the Finnish companies lost their privileges.
To cope with the turmoil in Russian markets has turned out to be extremely
challenging. Foreign companies have faced in Russia, for example, groping legislation,
unstable taxation, corruption, barter trade, and lack of reliable partners. In the early
1990s, the whole society was unstable and the decision-making structure disorganized.
For example, Nokia/ICL Data put lots of effort to a business deal with the Russian
army, but after a while it became obvious that no one was able to make the final
decision on the Russian side (Salmi 1995). Nokia/ICL Data decided to leave Russia and
concentrate on the Baltic markets, because the competition there was not so stiff and the
transition process was expected to progress faster, especially in Estonia (Salmi 2000,
11). In spite of all, several Finnish companies have managed to enter successfully the
Russian markets. However, many companies have mainly concentrated on trade actions
instead of direct investments in production assets.
This study presents two case studies about the companies, Outokumpu and
Baltic Beverage Holding AB (BBH). Outokumpu is a mining company which has long
experience also from the Soviet era. During the Soviet era Outokumpu operated, for
example, in the Pechenga District together with Pechenganickel. On the other hand,
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BBH is a Scandinavian joint venture which was founded in 1991 aiming to establish
production and marketing networks in Russia and to the Baltic countries.
3.3.1 Outokumpu Company
Outokumpu Company was founded in the firth half of the 20th century to utilize
the copper ore deposit found in 1910 in Outokumpu, Eastern Finland. The company
expanded, opening several mines and metallurgical plants and developing basic metal
technology. A rapid growth period for Outokumpu was the 1980s when the company
focused on metal production, mining and technology at a worldwide scale and started
several international projects in Europe, South and North America, and Australia.
During the Soviet era Outokumpu mainly sold mining technology and bought
raw materials. To carry out this business the company opened a representative office in
Moscow in 1981. One part of the internationalization process of Outokumpu was the co-
operation with Norilsk Nickel by delivering technology and equipment to Norilsk. Part
of the equipment and machinery of Pechenganickel is also made by Outokumpu.
Outokumpu Company showed interest in starting joint ventures in the Soviet
Union in the late 1980s. Outokumpu searched enthusiastically for investment projects in
Russia, but then Finland was hit by deep depression which lowered the risk taking
ability of Outokumpu as well. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union Outokumpu
changed its strategy by aiming to open mines of their own in Russia (Hirvensalo 1996,
166). However, this process developed slowly and recently Outokumpu has for the time
being frozen these projects. The main reasons for these setbacks have been lack of
proper investment projects, and the strategy of Outokumpu to concentrate more on
metal production instead of mining projects.
At the beginning of the 1990s Norilsk Nickel was very eager to create joint
ventures with Outokumpu. Reasons for this was their lack of own experience in the
global metal markets and urgent need to find new customers from the West because of
the collapse of domestic markets (Blatov 1998). There was also the need to commence
and finance a new underground operation in Pechenga. In addition, managers of Norilsk
Nickel realized the need of modernization of their production units and this led to an
endeavor to find foreign creditors. Outokumpu was well know from the Soviet era and
was considered as a reliable partner.
During the whole of the 1990s Outokumpu was cautious with its business
actions in Russia. Outokumpu is still doing successful co-operation with Norilsk Nickel
by exporting production technology to Russia and importing raw materials to its own
downstream operations. The rouble crisis in August 1998 caused problems to several
foreign companies (especially exporters) in Russia, but Outokumpu in a way took
advantage from it via Norilsk Nickel. The crisis was of benefit to Norilsk Nickel,
because its incomes are mainly denominated in US dollars and costs in roubles. This
meant, for example, that tax debts of Norilsk Nickel was cut to the quarter after the
rouble started to float (Kotlyar 1999). The rouble crisis, together with higher ore prices,
have enabled Norilsk Nickel to start several investments in Siberia and in Pechenga.
This recovery of the Russian mining sector has created export opportunities for
Outokumpu’s technology. So far, Outokumpu has not commenced any joint mining or
basic metal project. Nevertheless, the company has small subsidiaries registered in
Russia.
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The lack of mutual interest and profitable investment projects has prevented
deeper co-operation. The economic state of Norilsk Nickel has lately improved because
of the higher world market prices, which has meant that the company is able to finance
its own investment projects (Rantanen 1999).
The experiences Outokumpu has had from the Russian (the Soviet Union)
markets are mainly positive. Outokumpu has managed to create long and reliable
business relation with Norilsk Nickel which is one of the most important reasons why
Outokumpu is still doing business in Russia (Rantanen 2000). During this co-operation
Outokumpu has managed to gain a noticeable amount of experience and know how to
do business in the Russian markets. However, Outokumpu is still concentrating on trade
actions instead of investments to Russia.
3.3.2 Baltic Beverage Holding AB
Baltic Beverage Holding AB (BBH) is one of the few successful examples of
Nordic investment projects in Russia during the 1990s.  BBH is owned by the Finnish
company Hartwall (50 per cent) and the Swedish-Norwegian company Pripps Ringnes
(50  per cent) and it was founded in 1991 to operate in the Baltic and Russian beer
markets. After ten years of operations BBH owns twelve breweries and eight malting
facilities which are situated in Russia, the Baltic countries, and Ukraine (Table 4).
Table 4. Breweries of BBH in 2000.
Company Acquired Owner-
ship
 As %
Production
Million
liters
Growth
Of
production
Market
share
as %
Personnel
21.12.
1999
Russia:
Baltika 1993 75 633 34 15 2 829
Baltika-Don 1997 83 - - - -
Yarpivo 1996 60 165 26 4 673
Tula Brewing 1997 69 100 20 2 614
Chelyabinskpivo 1999 75 61 - 1 596
Pikra 1999 50 67 - 1 700
Ukraine:
Slavutich 1996 75 109 40 13 674
Kolos 1998 99 16 - 2 605
The Baltic States:
Saku (Estonia) 1991 75 52 25 50 256
Aldaris (Latvia) 1992 75 60 23 48 429
Kalnapils
(Lith.)
1994 86 44 -5 20 228
Utenos Alus
(Lith.)
1997 99 42 - 21 372
Source: Annual Report 1999, Oyj Hartwall Ab.
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BBH commenced to buy companies in 1991 when it bought the brewing
company Saku in Estonia. The next step was Aldaris in Latvia in 1992 and Baltika, the
largest production unit of the company, was acquired in 1993. The company has started
its operation in the nearest markets, from the Baltic States and St. Petersburg, and
expanded to Ukraine and Siberia. The latest acquisitions have been Chelyabinskpivo in
Chelyabinsk and Pikra in Krasnojarsk. The diffusion to new market areas has taken
place step by step towards east and southeast (Fig. 10).
The company has been very expansive and profitable. The market share of BBH
in Russia is 23 per cent and in the Baltic States about a half of the beer markets. For
comparison, Hartwall owns 50 per cent of BBH’s shares and sold beer 196 million litres
in Finland in 1999 having the market share of 48 per cent. Baltika alone sold 663
million litres of beer in 1999, more than the entire market demand of beer in Finland.
Figure 10. The expansion of the acquisitions of BBH.
The production volume of BBH has developed as follows in million litres: 1991:
14, 1992: 50, 1993: 100, 1994: 160, 1995: 191, 1996: 456, 1997: 676, 1998: 913, 1999:
1278. The figures include the Baltic States, Russia, and Ukraine.
The main business strategy of BBH in the Russian markets was to rely on local
workers (including managers) and on local brands. Managers are often made co-owners.
In Russia BBH owns more than 50 per cent in every production plant and it is not
targeting at total ownership. By partial local ownership BBH aims to attach managers
and workers to the company, which has turned out to be a successful strategy. For
example, the quality of products has improved up to the western standards which has
meant better preservation and therefore wider distribution areas (Hirvensalo 1999, 58).
Some of the recent acquisitions are considered beneficial because of the improved and
joint logistics. Beer has been a local product in Russia, and Baltika is the first national
brand in the country.
Although Russians purchasing power is weak and Russians consume less beer
than, for example, Finnish consumers, the Russian beer market has a great potential.
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Therefore, BBH has put lots of effort and investments in Russia; in the eastern markets
the company achieved success especially in Russia. BBH has already been a market
leader for a few years and its market share has grown. Average volume growth of BBH
has been 81 per cent a year and they are expecting to do even better in 2000 (Ramm-
Schmidt 2000). In addition, in spite of the devaluation of the rouble BBH’s profitability
has been excellent; this is clear for example, if compared to its parent companies. The
company is also a notable taxpayer, for example, in 1998 about 10 per cent of St.
Petersburg’s budget was covered by alcohol taxes from BBH (Hirvensalo 1999, 58).
The rouble crisis in August 1998 caused serious problems also to BBH. For
example, investment plans had to be changed and product prices were raised. However,
BBH also took advantage from the crisis because export from the west was almost
completely staunched, and local breweries became even cheaper investment objects
(Hirvensalo 1999, 61). But even a more serious problem than the rouble crisis has been
the lack of suitable subcontractors. BBH has encouraged and even offered long-term
contracts to few non-Russian investors, but suspicion towards the Russian business
environment is preventing these co-operations (Ramm-Schmidt 2000). In addition, BBH
has also faced the hard criminality of the Russian business life: one of the company’s
top managers was murdered in 1999.
BBH has succeeded very well in the markets of Russia, the Baltic States and
Ukraine. Its success is based on the introduction of modern production, logistics and
marketing to beer production. It proves that there are certain fields where there are no
insuperable institutional barriers for foreign companies in the economies of those
countries. The production of BBH is targeting on a growing consumer market and the
main population centers. A production niche has been found.
4. Attitudes of the Russian Employees in Pechenga District
What do the Russians think about foreign business partners and foreign
investors? Are they eager or reluctant to welcome global economic integration? What
sort of seedbed for industrial co-operation exists in the Russian North?
In the mining complex of Nikel-Zapolyarnyj, the main production units in the 10
by 30 kilometer mining area situated in Arctic conditions are three open pits,
underground operations, a mill producing nickel concentrate, a roaster plant producing
pellets, a sulfuric acid plant and a smelter. When the first interviews were conducted in
June 1998, the mines and factories employed 9 000. Retirements and layoffs were seen
as an outlet for financial woes. In 1997, 800 employees became redundant; and in 1998
the labor force was further reduced by another 1 100. Layoffs continued in 1999 when
the number of employees decreased by 12 000 in the whole combine of Norilsk Nickel.
The Pechenganickel is part of the nickel production chain that processes local
nickel ore and ore concentrate from Norilsk, 3 000 kilometers east of the Pechenga
District. The nickel produced by the Pechenganickel is further processed in
Monchegorsk. The main concern of the Pechenganickel in the late 1990s was lack of
competitiveness and profitability. The declining price of nickel did not account for all
the losses; the main reasons were raw material problems and inefficient production.
During the research interviews, the managers (CEO and executive director of mining) of
Pechenganickel voiced concerns about insufficient resources for the necessary
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modernization investments (Blatov and Kamkin 1998). However, the recent
development of nickel ore price has been favorable for Pechenganickel which has meant
that the company is able to extend its lifespan by investments.
Workers were interviewed during the summers of 1998 and 1999. The following
analysis is based on these interviews; 813 employees between the ages of 18 and 62
(average age 37 years) were interviewed in Zapolyarnyj and Nikel. Interviews were
based on a systematic random sample. Employees were interviewed by Russian research
assistants.
The logic of the analysis is based on the causal thinking that local people behave
according to the following sequence of reasoning, leading to co-operation with foreign
actors: 1) awareness of the economic problems, 2) a need to find ways to restructure the
company successfully (relying on existing organizations), 3) a search for advanced
technology and ways of implementing it (in this case from the global markets), 4) using
foreign technology and capital inputs, and 5) accepting both a foreign company as a
shareholder and foreign contract work. This sequence of reasoning ends up with the
attitudes of employees toward collaboration with foreign actors, that is, possible
acceptance of a foreign company as a shareholder and acceptance of foreign labor.
According to Table 5, the vast majority of employees consider replacement
investments and investments in new operations to be necessary: “Mining company
urgently needs major modernization investments” is agreed with 4/5 of the employees.
Employees do not trust the ability of the management to carry out investments and
consider that the management does not think about what is best for the employees (see
statements 5, 6 and 9). Employees prefer employees’ ownership more than the
participation of local authorities in decision-making (statements 7 and 8).
The logical and concrete starting points for the evaluation of attitudes is found in
Pechenganickel: employees recognize that investments are needed, and they are ready to
implement the process of modernization (Table 5). The critical issue is how the
modernization will be carried out. What sort of mental barriers exist to foreign
collaboration? Do the attitudes hinder co-operation?
The employees of the Pechenganickel are very convinced that advanced
technology from international suppliers is needed for modernization. The statement
“The mining company of this town needs western technology” is supported by 4/5 of
the employees. In the interviews only 6 per cent of the employees who intended to
continue working in the company denied the crucial importance of imported technology,
and only 8 per cent of the employees had at all something negative toward foreign
investors. In the case of company restructuring, 7 out of 10 employees would like to
continue working in the company. Positive attitudes to western technology (statement
11) are based on past experience. Most of the advanced machinery and equipment of the
company have been acquired from world markets during recent decades.
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Table 5. Attitudes of the employees of Pechenganickel: from awareness to
collaboration. All interviewed employees are considered.
Alternatives: Strongly agree (Sa), Agree (A), Neutral (N), Disagree (D), Strongly
disagree (Sd).
Largest
category and its
share,  %
Agree or
strongly
agree, %
Awareness of the problems:
1. Mining company urgently needs major modernization
investments
A  46.9 78.3
2. Modernization reduces pollution A  47.8 63.4
3. Modernization investments are urgently needed to ensure
jobs
N  29.1 38.8
4. I believe that in the near future the mining company is
going to face major modernization investments
N  41.4 33.9
Human resource policy and participation:
5. The present company will not pay any attention to the
needs of its individual employees
N  36.8 51.0
6. The top management will do whatever is most profitable
in the short term, regardless of the long-term interests of the
company and its employees
A  39.5 59.4
7. Workers should have a bigger share of stocks in the
mining company than they have now
A  40.0 64.6
8. Local authorities should play a larger role in developing
the mining Company
N  31.7 49.9
Trust
9. The present company will do the best it can to look after
the  welfare of all its employees
N  40.5 32.9
10. The local people at the top do not have the skills to
introduce this sort of major changes successfully
N  49.7 35.1
Western technology
11. The mining company of this town needs western
technology
A  55.7 80.3
12. In the long-run, foreign modernization investments will
bring prosperity to this town and workers
N  40.3 44.1
Attitudes to foreign partners:
13. It would be best if investments could be done by a
domestic company
      Sa  34.4 59.3
14. Foreign mining companies as shareholders of the
Pechenga Nikel are welcome
N  36.0 39.4
15. Foreign people (builders, workers, managers etc.) are
welcome to this town
       D 35.9 22.3
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Employees have some experiences from foreign experts and consultation. Non-
Russian companies have to some extent installed their machinery and equipment using
their own employees in recent decades. Russian experts have often been trained in the
West to use new technology. For instance, this happened in the early 1990s when
Outokumpu Oyj renewed a mill in Zapolyarnyj. There is also collaboration with foreign
partners in everyday operations, such as in blasting.
Domestic technology is not a real alternative because of the widened technology
gap between Russia and advanced industrialized countries (Naulapää 2000, 254).
Reason for this is mainly the ignorance of production development and research in
Russia. However, the employees are not sure whether multinational investments will
bring prosperity to the town, as the responses to statement 12 indicate.  Benefits may be
used, for instance, to cover earlier losses and to pay profits rather than for the benefits of
the workers.
Employees clearly would like to keep the control of the company in Russian
hands (statement 13). Foreign companies are not very welcome as shareholders
(statement 14). This preference for domestic companies is not unanticipated. Similar
attitudes are found, for example, in a more international orientated economy like
Australia is (Tykkyläinen 1994). Likewise, in Karelia on some economic issues the
locals are very nationalistic. For instance, when business school students in Karelia
(n=72) were asked for their opinions, 61 per cent agreed to some degree (strongly
agreed, agreed or slightly agreed) with the statement that Karelian business should be
owned by Russian citizens, and 78 per cent would like to see round wood exports to
Finland restricted (Tykkyläinen & Jussila 1998). The latest public opinion poll of 2 338
people in Karelia supports this result (Karelian … 2000). These protectionist attitudes
are common when we talk about natural resources and large companies, but not for
business in general. Karelian students consider joint ventures very necessary and favor
deeper integration with the European Union (Tykkyläinen & Jussila 1998). It is a very
common Russian attitude that natural resources are a national, invaluable asset which
should be controlled nationally.
Employees face severe reduction of the labor force, which takes place through
labor adjustment programs that prefer retirement and a voluntary search for jobs
elsewhere. This is certainly an important reason why foreign employees (builders,
workers, managers etc.) are not very welcome to Nikel and Zapolyarnyj, as the
responses to the respective statement indicate that only a fifth of the employees
considers it positive.
In summary, the attitudes of employees to collaboration are well grounded in the
context of the socio-economic situation (the need for modernization, labor reduction,
etc.) of the mining sector in Nikel and Zapolyarnyj. The results show that attitudes to
foreign collaboration are favorable and do not hinder co-operation. As expected,
employees defend their own interests and expect that the collaboration will improve the
competence of the company and their own position. On the other hand, unrealistically
high expectations for improved results may lead to disappointment, resulting in strikes
and economic losses, as happened at the paper mill acquired by AssiDoman in Segezha
in the late 1990s (Tykkyläinen & Jussila 1998).
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5. Conclusion
The collapse of the Soviet Union affected Finland’s economy more than any
other capitalist country’s. However, the Finnish-Russian trade managed to recover
relatively quickly. Already in 1993 the growth rate of Finland's export to former Soviet
states was higher than any other OECD country’s (Kivikari 1997, 271). In addition, the
Finnish trade to Russia has increased quite evenly during the 1990s (except after rouble
crisis in 1998) in spite of the decline of GDP in Russia. Former, Soviet time, contacts
and experiences can partly explain this peculiarity. Even so, the growth rate of the
Finnish-Russian trade has not corresponded to expectations of export enterprises  (see
for example Ollilla, 1999).
Finnish export to Russia managed to recover since the early 1990s and the
absolute figure in 1997 was near to the level of the late 1980s. However, Finnish export
to Russia collapsed again after the rouble crisis in August 1998. Therefore, the Russian
share (4.1 per cent) of Finland's whole export is only about one fourth compared to the
Soviet time. As an illustration, the gravity model (Table 3.) shows unused export
potential. Reasons to this are, for example, the European markets (EU membership),
concentration to the telecommunication industry, the unstable Russian markets, and the
increased competition in the Russian market together with the weak purchasing power
of the Russians. Finnish exporters increased market orientation to the main EU area
during the 1990s (Fig. 11).
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Figure 11. Finnish export to few European countries in 1989-1999 (Finnish Board of
Customs 2000).
The Finnish foreign direct investment (FDI) figures show even a clearer
orientation to the European Economic Area. For example, in the Baltic Sea region (see
Fig. 9) 98 per cent of the Finnish FDI are directed to neighboring EEA-countries
(Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Germany), and only 2 per cent to the former Soviet
Union Republics (Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) and Poland. In fact, it seems
obvious that Finnish enterprises are going to continue cautious investment policy
especially towards Russia, because the rouble crises in August 1998 gave an extra
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warning to the Western investors. Furthermore, several Finnish enterprises are cautious
even with their trade actions by still using the prepayment system.
Many companies in the Russian North and Northwest are the economic victims
of the collapsed superpower. At one time, the resource frontier of the forest industry and
mining sector shifted to the Russian northern border territories. That period is over, and
many of the resources uses are not economically viable in the new economic conditions
where global market prices determine the internal prices and where financial support
from the state is not possible. The inability to make replacement investments indicates
serious structural problems in the resource-based industry of this region. If demand does
not recover and companies can not provide marketable products, many factories will
gradually be downsized. So far, the Russian economic development has favored
consumer goods industry – not heavy industry which has often been linked to the
military production.
The Russian northern territories were developed based on the large-scale
production and the presence of armed forces, which also determined much of the border
relations. This sector represents the currently declining economic sector – formerly
prioritized, subsidized and controlled by the core of the Soviet regime. This system
collapsed. Opening up the border did not lead to a continuation of the former Soviet
trade pattern and to economic growth, and there were no favorable conditions for
profitable production. Economic cross-border co-operation did not flourish.
But what about the mental boundary? Is it also a hindrance? People are
associated with places and regions, and they easily reject influences from “others”. The
strong sympathy towards collaboration with international suppliers indicates that co-
operation is considered, in the first place, as an economic option. The outlook toward
collaboration is not emotional, affective or political in the sense that Finns think of the
ceded part of Karelia. If most people in Russia had been exceedingly nationalistic and
unresponsive, they would have denied the importance of imported technology and co-
operation with foreign partners – and that was not the case. However, people prefer
domestic companies as a local operator and they are suspicious of foreign control and
the inflow of labor.  Still, in principle, mental barriers are low.
Institutionalists blame bureaucracy and customs. Are there any more important
causes beyond those factors? Is it just lack of demand and the disadvantageous location
of economic activities which matter in border areas? Such argument can be supported as
well. This is illustrated by the success of BBH. This beer producer has penetrated to the
markets of the transitional countries rapidly and effectively.  BBH's success proves that
there are fields and conditions where there are no insuperable institutional barriers for
foreign companies in the economies of those countries.
To sum up, development is bound to history and space in Russia, but the actors
of development are evolving and finding new solutions. The main causes for sluggish
development in many resource-based sectors seem to be demand-driven and structural
(and spatio-structural). The collapse of the former economic system brought about such
a deep decline with which only few companies could properly cope. Nevertheless, the
Russian economy is under reconstruction and recovering. This restructuring seems to
happen in a selective way; former socio-economic structures and geography are
changing in a way which is not easy to anticipate.
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